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What money buys: clients of street sex workers in the US1
by 
Marina Della Giusta2, Maria Laura Di Tommaso3, Isilda Shima4, Steinar Strøm5
Abstract 
The paper presents a review of current theoretical and empirical approaches to 
sex work, followed by the presentation of an original theoretical framework (Della 
Giusta et al, 2006) which is tested with an econometric model of the characteristics of 
demand for sex services by a sample of clients of street sex workers in the US. We 
present findings in relation to stigma and the relationship between paid and unpaid sex 
that corroborate our model’s hypotheses and are in line with findings from other 
empirical studies. Furthermore, we identify in our sample two diametrically opposite 
profiles: one for clients whom we label ‘experimenters’, and one for more 
experienced ones that we name ‘regulars’, we also estimate attitudes toward risk, and 
draw implications in terms of both policy and future theoretical and empirical 
research. 
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1. Introduction 
The social scientific literature on sex work is vast (recent authoritative 
monographs on the subject are O’Connell Davidson, 1998, and Lim, 1998) and 
representative of many different views and concerns. A substantial part of the 
literature on sex work consists of studies of sex work and its relationship with 
violence, health and drugs problems, and international migration, and is often devoted 
to investigating the desirability of alternative regulatory regimes and the definition of 
rights for sex workers (McKeganey and Barnard, 1996; O’Kane, 2002; Thorbek and 
Pattanaik, 2002; Doezema, 1998; Tiggey et al, 2000). Whilst studies of sex workers 
are widespread, those who address the demand side of the industry are harder to come 
by, and wanting to rigorously analyse demand characteristics on the basis of empirical 
evidence can prove very difficult: ‘Presumably, the client has not been studied until 
very recently because his actions are not perceived as morally reprehensible. A man 
who buys sex is viewed simply as a "man" doing "what men do" and therefore there is 
nothing unique or interesting enough about his behaviour to justify 
research……….For this reason, paid sex is considered legitimate, even “natural,” but 
part of a private realm that is best left un-discussed. In the US 16% of men reported 
buying sex at least once in their lives, and 0.5 % reported doing so at least once a 
year. In Finland, as in Russia, it was found that 10-13% of men had purchased sex at 
least once. In Norway, the comparable figure is 11%, in Holland 14%, in Switzerland 
19%, in London 7-10%, and in Spain 39%. Figures in the 70% range have been 
recorded for Cambodia and Thailand, but these, too, appear to be imprecise 
estimates’ (Ben-Israel and Levenkron, 2005:13). 
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Findings from empirical studies of clients suggest that personal characteristics 
(personal and family background, self-perception, perceptions of women, sexual 
preferences), economic factors (education, income, work), as well as attitudes towards 
risk (health hazard and risk of being caught where sex work is illegal), lack of interest 
in conventional relationships, desire for variety in sexual acts or sexual partners, and 
viewing sex as a commodity, are all likely to affect demand.  
For example, Pitts et al (2004) surveyed a sample of 1225 men and women in 
Australia6 and found that 23.4% had paid for sex at least once, and reported paying 
for sex to satisfy sexual needs (43.8%), because paying for sex is less trouble (36.4%), 
and because it is entertaining (35.5%). Significantly, they found that there were not 
many significant differences between men who had paid for sex and those who had 
not, except that the once who had were on average older, less likely to have university 
education and to have had a regular partner in the last year. The motivations of sex 
workers’ clients in the UK (who were all males and appeared to be representatives of 
all sectors of society) studied in the course of a programme7 on the sex industry 
presented by Channel 4 appeared to convey the impression that a connection existed 
between the effort and costs associated with finding a sexual partner who would 
readily satisfy their sexual preferences, and the straightforward and readily accessible 
option of sex work. This is confirmed by Thorbek and Pattanaik (2002), who draw a 
sort of “psychological” profile of male sex tourists on the basis of their own 
descriptions of themselves and accounts of their experiences indicating that many of 
them are finding relationships with others very difficult (either because they do not 
 
6 The sample was taken by distributing a survey to customers of a Sexpo exhibition hold in Melbourne 2001. This is a 
commercial event hosting a wide range of exhibitors of products associated with sex; of 4.905 respondents, 1225 received a 
version of the questionnaires with questions on sex workers. Among 1225 respondents , 612 were men and 601 were women.  
7 Dispatches: Sex on the Street; Channel 4 season Prostitution –The Laws Don’t Work, Channel 4, September 2002 
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have the time or the skills required to meet people) and choose sex tourism as an 
“easier” alternative, which does not imply any responsibility towards the person 
providing the sexual service. As for the views they held of sex workers, it appears that 
both sexism and racism mix in determining a very marked distancing, which allowed 
sex tourists to practically ignore and show no interest in the lives and working 
motivations of the sex workers whose services they buy. Wider phenomena connected 
to consumerism and globalisation are also clearly related to this industry, which 
reflects multiple power structures: Marttila (2003) concludes from her study of 
Finnish clients that: ‘the sex business is first and foremost about gendered, economic, 
social and cultural – global and local – power structures. (Marttila, 2003:8). Women 
clients are also engaging in sex tourism, as documented both in Thorbek and 
Pattanaik, and in Sanchez Taylor (2001). The latter in particular offers a more in-
depth analysis of North American and Northern European women buying sex work 
services of young men in the Caribbean, in what they themselves describe as 
‘romance holidays’. Responses to her interviews suggest that, on the one hand, 
women clients are mostly reluctant to define what they ngage in as sex work, and, on 
the other, that their ideas about the young men whose service they buy are deeply 
rooted in racist ideas about black men and black men’s sexuality. The theme of 
inequality appears to be at the core of the relationship: prejudices that allow the 
stigmatisation of another person as fundamentally “different” and inferior to oneself 
appear again and again in customers’ accounts (Ben-Israel et al., 2005; Pitts et al, 
2004; Kern, 2000; Blanchard, 1994). From this literature emerges that stigma is an 
important characteristic that we should include in our theoretical model, as is the 
notion that the demand for paid sex is different from the demand for freely exchanged 
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sex, and incorporates more complex issues which we hope to see reflected in our 
empirical estimates. 
The economic literature has traditionally approached the supply side of the paid 
sex market either showing how it is similar to other markets, or studying it as a form 
of crime and analysing the costs and benefits of alternative regulatory regimes, 
generally agreeing that the main motivation behind supply is an economic one (for a 
review, see Reynolds, 1986). More recent theoretical and empirical contributions have 
focussed on modelling prices (Moffat and Peters, 2001; Edlund and Korn, 2002; 
Cameron, 2002), different types of supply and their determinants (Cameron et al, 
1999; Cameron and Collins, 2003), health risk and the effect of condom use on sex 
worker’s earnings (Rao et al, 2003; Gertler et al, 2003), and, more recently, the 
evolution of paid sex markets and the ways in which urban spaces favour sexual 
transactions (Collins, 2004). The latter collection is much broader in scope, with paid 
sex markets being studied as part of the wider sexual market in which people seek 
partners for reasons that include deficiencies in amount or range of sexual activities in 
which they participate, or diversification of sexual consumption (Collins, 2004, 
p.1634).  
Edlund and Korn (2002) have modelled sex work as a highly paid, low skill 
female occupation alternative to marriage explaining high wages in terms of a loss of 
position in the marriage market. Cameron (2002), provides a more sophisticated 
explanation for high wages in terms of compensation for social exclusion, risk 
(assault, disease, arrest, punishment), front loading in wage profile (informal pension 
scheme or insurance), boredom and physical effort, distaste (potential psychological 
and physical costs), loss of recreational sex pleasure, anti-social and inconvenient 
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6
hours, possible excess demand and prices used to screen quality, taboos, and agent 
fees (Cameron, 2002). Moffatt and Peters (2001) find that prices are affected by 
duration of the transaction, location, and age of the sex worker, but that client 
satisfaction and price paid are affected by different factors. Stigma enters these 
models in the form of a barrier faced by sex workers when wanting to enter other 
professions, but it is unrelated to the nature of the transaction between sex worker and 
client. Cameron and Collins (2003) model males’ decision to entry the market for sex 
work services, where the male has the choice to derive utility from one relationship 
partner and/or one paid sex partner. They distinguish between the motivations of men 
in relationships (variety, specific acts, frequency, outlet for stress) and single men 
(“relative search costs of finding willing sexual partners, or partners wiling to engage 
in specific sexual activities in an ad hoc or formal social context, and in a given time 
period” ibid. p.274).  
Most models to date have shared the assumptions that the object of the sex work 
transaction is sex, and that sex work is one of the possible ways in which women (and 
occasionally men) can supply sex to men. Sex work is viewed in these papers as a 
more or less close substitute to other forms of sexual exchange, and being a man is 
essential to demanding this service. Biological determinism is used to varying degrees 
of explicitness and sophistication as the underlying theory of human sexual behaviour, 
which implies that it is not possible to have a unified economic theory of sex work 
independent of the sexual identities of the parties involved. Garofalo (2002) is to date 
the only feminist contribution focussed on explaining the different prices paid in the 
different sex work sub-markets in terms of the power asymmetries between 
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7
contractual parties, concentrating on the role of female sex work in the construction of 
male identity. 
 
2. Theoretical model 
The theoretical basis for the present paper is an economic model of sex work 
developed in Della Giusta et al (2006), which contains a number of assumptions 
regarding the behaviour of individuals and the opportunities and constraints they face, 
and incorporates both stigma and inequality between client and sex worker. Stigma is 
modelled as the effect on reputation from participating in this market, and we use 
insights on modelling reputations from the both the economic and sociology literature 
(Granovetter, 1985; Bordieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993; Mansky, 2000), 
which point to two distinct ways in which reputations matter to economic agents: 
firstly because as social beings they derive utility from a positive evaluation by others 
in the social groups they belong to (Casson, 1991), and secondly because they are 
aware of the costs that social sanctions may impose on their material progress 
(Akerlof, 1980; Arnott and Stiglitz, 1991). Reputation has thus both intrinsic and 
instrumental value: it is desired per-se (provider of utility) and can be used to access 
other earning opportunities. Stigma is a loss of reputation, which can affect social 
standing and therefore both pay and working conditions (particularly personal risk) as 
well as access to services and other jobs for sex workers. Following Akerlof (1980), 
we include reputation in agents’ preferences in our model and allowe agents to have a 
different concern for their reputation depending on their personal characteristics and 
the specific moment at which they exercise choice. In the model, we also assume that 
the demand for sex and the demand for sex work are not perfect substitutes, to reflect 
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8
the fact that clients’ may have other motivations, which we aim to explore empirically 
in the present paper.  
Focusing on the demand side of the model, and following Della Giusta et al 
(2006), let 
(1)  U(S0, S, C, r, X)  
denote the utility of a possible client buying sex. S0 is the amount of freely 
exchanged sex that the client has, whereas S is the amount of sex that the client has 
with sex workers. Amounts of sex can be measured in terms of number of sexual 
events (number of visits) during a certain period. C is consumption of other goods and 
services than sex, r is a variable related to reputation and stigma effects, and X is a 
vector of individual characteristics. The utility function is assumed to be increasing in 
{S0,S,C, r} and  strictly quasi-concave.  
Let w denote the price per event with a sex worker and let I denote disposable 
income. The budget constraint is given by 
(2)  I=wS+C. 
Let R denote capacity for reputation losses, which is reduced the more sex is 
bought; or 
(3)   r=R-S 
Given that sex is bought, which means that the client has passed the moral and 
emotional threshold of buying sex, the amount of sex bought that maximizes utility 
(1) under the constraint (2) and (3) is given by the following demand function 
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(4)   S=f(w,I,R,S0,X)  
We expect that the amount of sex bought is decreasing in the price w, increasing in 
income and in the capacity for reputation losses. If demand for paid sex decreases with 
regular sex, S0, paid sex and free sex are substitutes. Otherwise they are complements. In this 
paper, we explore empirically whether our assumptions regarding the motivations for demand 
are valid, by developing an econometric model of client’s demand with data from a US survey 
of clients of street sex workers (Monto, 2000a).  
3. Description of the data 
The dataset contains background characteristics, attitudes, and reported 
behaviours of arrested male clients of female street sex workers in four US cities ( San 
Francisco, Portland, Las Vegas, Santa Chiara) over the period 1996-1999 (Monto, 
2000a). The data was collected in the context of two client intervention programmes 
aiming to address the male demand side of sex work: Portland’s Sexual Exploitation 
Education Project and San Francisco’s First Offender Prostitution Program, both 
aiming at prevention efforts with clients, rather than with sex workers.8
Clients who were caught at the moment of paying a street sex worker and arrested 
were asked to participate in the San Francisco's First Offender Prostitution Program 
followed by similar initiatives in Santa Clara and Fresno, California and Las Vegas, 
Nevada. The one-day workshop aimed to instruct the arrested clients about the legal, 
social and health- related consequences of engaging in sex work and endow them with 
persuasive reasons to not rehire sex workers. The program considers sex work as an 
institution built on violence, sexual exploitation, poverty and misogyny. The 
 
8 The Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (a unit within the Institute for Social Research at the 
University of Michigan, USA) provided the data. Data are available and downloadable from: 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu:8080/ABSTRACTS/02859.xml?format=ICPSR
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participation of the arrested clients in this program allowed them to be dismissed by 
their crime against a 500 dollar fee. The Portland program was a 15-hour, weekend 
workshop administered by an independent organization in cooperation with the 
District Attorney’s Office. Some of the men participating in the programmes were 
required to do so as part of their sentence, others had reduced fines or the arrest 
purged from their records in exchange for their attendance.  Arrested clients of street 
sex workers who accepted to participate to an intervention program compiled a 
detailed anonymous self-administered questionnaire. Over 80% of participants 
completed the questionnaires, resulting in a sample of 1342 individuals.9
The data collection process implies 3 levels of selection: 
1. The individuals in the data set are those who were caught. We are not 
able to check if the arrested clients’ characteristics are similar or different from those 
who were not caught. We can speculate on possible correlations between being a 
regular client and the ability of not being caught but we are not able to measure the 
possible bias generated by this first selection. 
2. The individuals in the data set are those who participate in the re-
habilitation programme. We do not have information on those clients who did not 
participate. 
3. The individuals in the data set are those who, being arrested and 
participating in the re-habilitation program, did complete the questionnaire. 
These three selection levels introduce a bias in our analysis. Arrested clients 
could be on average less experienced in buying sex from street sex workers than non-
 
9 Though refusals constituted the largest single category of non-completions, language barriers and late arrivals also accounted 
for a substantial proportion. Of these 1,342 respondents, 36 from San Francisco and 15 from Las Vegas completed a Spanish-
language version of the questionnaire. Completing the English version of the questionnaire were 950 men from San Francisco, 
254 from Las Vegas, 77 from Portland, and 10 from Santa Clara.  
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11
arrested clients and therefore end up in being caught. Moreover arrested clients 
motives for seeking sex workers could be different from those who were not caught. 
In this paper we do not deal with selection bias issues, which we leave for future 
work.  
Table 1 compares the sample of clients with a National sample taken from the 
National Health and Social Life Survey, conducted in 1992, using a nationally 
representative sample10 which contains extensive information on the US population 
aged 18-59 able to complete an interview in English.  
Comparing our sample with the national survey, we note an under-representation 
of whites relative to other ethnic groups. On average, our clients are slightly older 
than the national sample and more of them are not married respect to in the national 
sample. They also have unhappier marriages, more sex-partners compared to in the 
national sample, lower frequencies of sex during the 12 months prior to the interview, 
and are on average better educated respect to the national sample: 71% have at least 
some college after high-school, against 35% nationally. Labour force participation is 
similar to the national sample.  
(Table 1. Characteristics of arrested clients compared to the National Sample)  
In our sample, 27% of respondents claimed that they had never had sexual 
relations with a sex worker (see Table 2)11. The most common circumstance of the 
first encounter with a sex worker was being approached by a sex worker (33%), 
followed by “approached the sex worker on my own” (30%), and “a group of buddies 
 
10 The nationally representative sample data of The National Health and Social Life Survey are provided by Monto (2000b). The 
survey data are collected by personal interviews and self-administered questionnaires, and provide information on the sexual 
experiences as well as social, demographic (race, education, political and religious affiliation and occupation), attitudinal 
(amongst which attitudes toward premarital sex, the appeal of particular sexual practices, levels of satisfaction with particular 
sexual relationships), and health-related characteristics. The overall response rate was 78.6 percent of the 4,369 eligible 
respondents selected for inclusion in the study. The sample reported in Table 1 includes only the non missing values. 
11 Because men in the sample were almost all arrested while propositioning a decoy posing as a sex worker, it is possible that 
some had never before sought out a sex worker or had not successfully completed the transaction.  
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set me up” (24%).  The most frequent sexual act done with the sex worker was oral 
sex (54%), followed by vaginal sex (14%). As far as risk is concerned, 74% of the 
sample declared that they always used a condom (for more details see Table 2). 
 
(Table 2. Attitudes toward sexual behaviour) 
Arrested clients were asked to agree or disagree with 13 statements designed to 
reflect popular and scholarly understandings of the reasons men seek out sex workers. 
Many findings from other studies are supported by these results, which indicate 
clearly that demand for paid sex and free sex are not perfect substitutes.  
(Table 3. Motives for seeking sex workers) 
From the responses it can be observed that a considerable number of clients 
appear to be excited by the illicit, risky, or different quality of sex with a sex worker. 
Some men pay for sex because they have difficulty becoming involved in 
relationships, and for some of these men sex work is an attempt not only to have sex, 
but also to establish intimate relationships with women. Some of the men said that 
they had the time, energy, or interest also to engage in a conventional relationship 
with a woman. 
Given the scope of the study our data comes from, we also include the analysis of 
the relationship between sex work and violence by exploring the “rape myth 
acceptance”12, which implicitly demonstrates a tendency of violence against women 
(Burt, 1980). The response rates presented in Table 4 indicates that the arrested clients 
do show some attitudes that validate the “rape myth acceptance”. 30% of clients think 
 
12 Rape myths are attitudes that have been shown to support sexual violence against women. Rape myths are "prejudicial, 
stereotyped, or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and rapists" (Burt, 1980, p. 217) that serve to justify or support sexual 
violence against women and diminish support for rape victims. They include the idea that women who are raped are in some way 
responsible for the violence against them, the idea that women often lie about being raped for selfish reasons, and the idea that 
only sexually promiscuous women are raped. 
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that provocative dress asks for trouble; 17% think that rape victims have a bad 
reputation. 23% think that going home with a man implies willingness to have sex 
with him.  
(Table 4. Rape myth acceptance) 
 
4. Modelling demand and risk aversion 
In what follows, we move to our empirical model of the demand for paid sex, for 
which we use two specifications: an ordered logit model of demand for paid sex, and 
a multinomial logit model of the probability of being a regular client. 
The first specification is an ordered logit model with four categories of having 
sex with a sex worker. Let *ny be person n’s demand for having sex with a sex worker 
during a year. Here this demand is considered as a latent variable. Let xn be a vector 
of explanatory variables that affect demand.  is a vector of unknown coefficients. 
Moreover let n be a random variable. We then have the following demand function 
for paid sex:  
*
n n n ; n 1,2,, , N(5) y x == +
Let ynj be the observation of how many times the clients have had sex with a sex 
worker during a year, j=1,2,3,4, where j=1 means that the client has not been with a 
sex worker before he was observed and arrested, j=2 means that the client has been 
with a sex worker once before, j=3 mean that he has had sex with a sex worker more 
than once, but less than once per month, and j=4 if the client has had sex with a sex 
worker more than once per month. Thus the ordered structure of demand is given by: 
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nj
1 if client n belongs to category j; j 1,2,3,4(6) y
0 otherwise
=
=
Let j denote the threshold in the ordering of the demand, we then have 
*
nn1 1
*
nn2 1 2
*
nn3 2 3
*
nn4 3
y 1 if y
y 1 if y
(7)
y 1 if y
y 1 if y
= 
=  < 
=  < 
=  <
The thresholds j must satisfy 1<2<3. From (5) and (7) we obtain: 
*
n n n nnj j 1 j j 1 j(8) P(y 1) P( y ) P( x x ) = =  <  =   <     
We will assume that n is i.i.d. with c.d.f. P(n u)=F(u). The n-s are assumed to 
be logistic distributed, with the first moment of the distribution equal to zero and the 
second moment equal to 	2/3. Thus 
u
1(9) F(u)
1 e
=
+
Now we can rewrite (8) to yield: 
n nnj j j 1(10) P(y 1) F( x ) F( x )= =       
and where the distribution function F(.) is given in (9). Note that 
4
nj n4 3 n
j 1
[P(y 1)] 1so that P(y 1) 1 F( x )
=
= = = =    

The likelihood function is: 
njyN 4
n nj j-1
n=1 j=1
(11) L( , ) = F( - x ) -F( - x )       
 
The coefficient vectors can then be estimated by maximizing this likelihood (or 
rather the log likelihood).  In order to calculate the marginal effects, we note that from 
(10) we obtain:  
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(12) n nnj j 1 j
n n n
P(y 1) F( x ) F( x )
;for j 1,2,3,4
x x x
  
  
 =        
=   =
  
 
From (9) and (12) we then derive: 
(13)
n1
1 n 1 n
n
n2
1 n 1 n 2 n 2 n
n
n3
2 n 2 n 3 n 3 n
n
n4
3 n 3 n
n
P(y 1) F( x )[1 F( x )]
x
P(y 1) {F( x )[1 F( x )] F( x )[1 F( x )]}
x
P(y 1) {F( x )[1 F( x )] F( x )[1 F( x )]}
x
P(y 1) {F( x )[1 F( x )]}
x
 =
=         

 =
=                

 =
=                

 =
=        

We note that the first and last marginal effects have an opposite sign. The terms 
in braces can be positive or negative. 
In the second specification of demand we model the probability of being a 
“regular” client (multinomial logit). Let Unj be the utility for client n of being j-type of 
client. When j=1, the client is a “regular” client and when j=0 he is an “experimenter”. 
We will assume that Unj is given by 
jnnj nj j 0,1;n 1, 2, , , N(14) U x ; = == + 
The vector xn is the same as in the ordered logit presented above, expect that it 
includes 1 to allow for a constant, and j is a vector of alternative specific 
coefficients. By assuming that nj is extreme value distributed (the double exponential 
distribution) with zero expectation and a constant variance, and by assuming utility 
maximization, we get the following probability for being a “regular” customer: 
K K
1k nk k nk
k 0 k 0
n1 n0 K K K
0k nk 1k nk k nk
k 0 k 0 k 0
n0k 1k 0k
exp( x ) exp( x )
(15) P(U U )
exp( x ) exp( x ) 1 exp( x )
where
, and x 1.
= =
= = =
 
 = =
 +  + 
 =    =
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Let yn1=1 if the individual has chosen to be a regular customer, and equal to zero 
otherwise, and let n1(kkxnk ) be the choice probability in (13). Then the likelihood 
of the data,  
(16)   n1 n1
N K K
y 1 y
n nn1 n1k k
k 0 k 0n 1
L( ) [ ( x )] [1 ( x )] 
= ==
 =    
 

The coefficients k, k=0,1,,,,K are estimated by maximizing this likelihood (or 
rather the log-likelihood).  
Apart from the demand for paid sex we also estimate the demand for condom use 
in order to analyse the peculiarity of clients’ behaviour with respect to risk. Condom 
use is almost always negotiated directly between the interested client and the sex 
worker. Therefore, the client who requires the use of condoms, signals that he has a 
more risk adverse attitude. The choice probability of using condom follows from a 
similar utility maximizing procedure, with an additive random utility model, as the 
one that led to the likelihood in (16).  
 
5. Empirical estimates. 
In order to estimate the model for demand of paid sex (as presented in Section 2, 
equations 1-4) we would need prices and income variables. In our data we do not 
observe the price paid, neither do we observe income. What we observe are the 
following variables: full-time work or not, education (college/or more, or less), age, 
job-type (executive/business manager versus lower level), race (non-white versus 
white), married or not.  Full-time jobs, education, age, job-type and race are important 
determinants for income. Income tends to be higher for workers with full-time job, for 
workers with higher education, for executive managers and for whites. Moreover, 
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with seniority wage structures income tend also to increase with age. However, 
education, job-type and race may also have a direct impact on the capacity for 
reputation losses so that this capacity is lower, i.e. easier to ruins one’s reputation, the 
higher the education is, the more leading job a person has, married versus non-
married. Thus we would expect full-time work to have a positive impact on demand 
for paid sex (positive income effect) while the impact of education, age, job type and 
race are ambiguous.  
The data also contains a large number of attitudinal variables. To see whether it 
was possible to reduce the number of variables, we performed a factor analysis with 
the purpose of uncovering a possible latent structure of these variables in the data 
set13. These factors will then be included in the demand function. In the factor 
analysis we exclude those variables which have a percentage of missing values 
exceeding 22%, as well as missing demographic variables. We derived 6 factors (as 
the number of eigenvalues exceeding 1 is 6) which are presented in Table 5. 
(Table 5. Factor analysis) 
The first factor, “against gender violence” is a pr dictor of violent sexuality. It 
might indicate that one of the motivations when clients approach the sex workers is 
the attraction to violence, which can be satisfied through buying sex with sex workers, 
if found to be a significant factor in explaining demand. The higher the score for this 
factor, the less gender violent is the client. 
 
13 The choice of the number of factors is based on the number of eigenvalues of pattern/correlation matrix, which is the 
covariance matrix of the standardized variables13, which are greater than 1. Eigenvalues for a certain factor measures the variance 
in all the variables, which are grouped into that factor. The ratio of eigenvalues is the ratio of explanatory importance of the 
factors with respect to the variables. A low eigenvalue poorly explains the variance of the variable. Thus the correlation between 
indicators and factors is characterized by large loadings above 0.5, moderate loadings between 0.3 and 0.5 and small loadings 
below 0.3. In our case we have considered only loadings > 0.45.  
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The second factor named “against sex work” can be taken to indicate both 
relatively conservative views and, alternatively, a commodified prospective toward 
sex work. The higher the score on this factor, the more the client is against sex work. 
The third factor is “sex workers are not different and dislike their job”. This 
factor contains also the idea that sex workers are different to other women in that they 
like men and sex more, and they like sex rougher; it can also be used as an indicator 
for justifying sex commodification and avoids the intrinsic feeling of treating of sex as 
commodity. The higher this factor score, the less clients think that sex workers are 
different and like their job.  
The fourth factor “like relationships” captures the fact that some respondents 
prefer sex work to relationships and find the latter burdensome, so they interact with 
individuals who can respond to their needs without demanding intimate relationships. 
The higher this factor, the more the clients like relationships and related 
responsibilities. 
Factor five, “variety dislike”, captures the view that sex work forms part of sex 
consumption, and can for example serve to satisfy those sexual appetites that the 
regular partner is unwilling to satisfy14, or the desire for variety of sexual partners. 
The higher this factor, the less the clients like variety.  
The sixth factor “Relationship troubles” reflects the actual relationship status of 
respondents. The higher the factor, the less intact and more troubled is the relationship 
life of the client.  
 
14 “The desire to "have a variety of sexual partners'' and "be in control during sex," and the need to "have sex immediately when 
I am aroused" all point to this kind of self-focused sexuality that Blanchard (1994) calls "McSex" in his popular expose on 
"young johns." According to one man he interviewed 'lit's like going to McDonalds; most people are looking for a good quick 
cheap meal. It's satisfying, it's greasy, and then you get the hell out of there.'' Paying for sex because of the desire to have sex 
with women with particular physical attributes, a motivation described by McKeganey (1994), also reflects a conception of sex as 
a commodity”. (Monto 2000b, pg 34). 
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The characteristic of being against sex work may be related to individuals with a 
lot to lose reputation wise when having commercial sex. Married persons tend to like 
relationship and may/or may not have troubles with relationship. The latter can also 
imply that to have sex one has to go outside marriage. These variables, and perhaps 
dislike variety, may thus capture the impact regular sex may have on the demand for 
commercial sex. In table 6 we summarize what our expectations are with respect to 
how the observed variables and the factors affect demand for sex work. 
 
7.  Results 
We use the frequency of encounters with a sex worker during last year as 
dependent variable in the ordered logit model (see Table A2 in the Appendix). We 
consider 4 categories j=1,2,3,4. Where j=1 means that the client has not been with a 
sex worker before he was observed and arrested, j=2 means that the client has been 
with a sex worker once before, j=3 mean that he has had sex with a sex worker more 
than once, but less than once per month, and j=4 if the client has had sex with a sex 
worker more than once per month. As far as the probability of being a regular clients 
is concerned, our second model, the dependent variable (see Table A3 in the 
Appendix) is defined equal 1 if the clients has been more than once with a sex worker 
over last year (categories 3 and 4 in the first model). The dependent variable is equal 0 
if the clients has been only once or never with a sex worker (categories 1 and 2 in the 
first model). 
The probability of using a condom (see Table A3 in the Appendix) is defined as 1 
if the client uses a condom more than once or often, and as 0 if the clients never or 
seldom use a condom. 
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The vector xn of explanatory variables that affect demand in the first model 
includes the following variables: the 6 factors defined in the previous paragraph, the 
working status of the client, his educational level, his age, his occupation, his race, his 
marital status, a variable about disliking control (see Table A4 for definitions and 
descriptive statistics). The dataset does not contain information regarding the level of 
earnings, and hence some of the personal characteristics proxy the income level.  
 The variable “dislike control” is defined in Table A5. It takes the value of 1 if 
clients agree strongly with the statement that they like control during sex. It takes the 
value of 2 if they agree somehow, value of 3 if they disagree somehow and value 
equal 4 if they disagree.  The higher the value for this value, the more individuals 
dislike control.  
 The vector xn of explanatory variables for the second and the third model are 
the same as for the first model but they also include an intercept.  
 Table 7 contains the estimation results for both the ordered logit for the 
demand of sex work, the logit for being a regular client and the probability of using a 
condom. 
(Table 7. Estimation results) 
The ordered logit results imply that demand for paid sex, in terms of frequency 
per year, is the same across education levels (this variable is not significantly different 
from 0), it is higher among full-time worker than individuals working less hours (this 
could be due to an income effect), and non-white individuals demand more than white 
individuals (this could be an effect related to the particular segment of the sex 
industry our sample is drawn from, or to the unobserved biases in the sample). 
Married individuals demand less than non-married. The variable control dislike is 
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very significant and the positive sign implies that the more individuals dislike control, 
the more they demand sex work; in other words the more they like control, the less 
they demand. Demand in our sample is increasing with the age of the client. In 
another specification of the model15, we have also added the age when first with a sex 
worker. We wanted to test the hypothesis that the younger a client starts to visit sex 
workers, the higher the frequency: a sort of addiction effect. Nevertheless we found 
that the variable was not significantly different from zero so we rejected the 
hypothesis of an addiction effect.  The positive sign for the coefficient of factor 1 
“against gender violence” implies that the higher this variable, i.e. the more the clients 
dislike violence, the more they demand. In other words, the more clients like gender 
violence the less they demand. The more clients are against sex work the less they 
demand (negative sign of factor 2 and significant at 10%). The more  they think that 
sex workers are not different and dislike their job the more they demand (positive sign 
of Factor 3 and significant at 5%). The parameter for Factor 4 “ Like relationships” is 
negative and strongly significant (1%) and it implies  that the more the clients like to 
be in a relationship with its responsibilities, the less they demand. Factor 5, “Variety 
dislike”, shows that the more they like variety in sex life, the more they demand paid 
sex (significant at 1%).  Factor 6, “Relationship troubles” is not significant. 
The results are somewhat mixed compared to prior expectations, but as 
demonstrated in Table 8, the overall results for the ordered logit in Table 7 shadow for 
differences in behaviour across individuals with little experience with sex workers 
(named “experimenters”) and those with more experience (named “regulars”). In 
Table 8, we distinguish between four groups of clients. The first two are those who 
 
15 Available from the authors on request. 
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declared to have never had sex with sex workers before or only once before: the 
“experimenters” (48% of respondents). Clients in the two last groups are named 
“regulars” because they declare having had sex with street sex workers at least more 
than one time, but less than once a month (3rd group) or 1 to 3 times a month (4th 
group), overall these are just over 52% of respondents. Table 8 shows the impact on 
demand of marginal changes in the explanatory variables, the marginal effects, within 
each group. As noted above the marginal effects in an ordered logit for the first and 
the last category must have opposite sign. The signs for the middle categories are free 
to vary. In our case, category 1 and 2 show the same pattern of behaviour and the 3rd 
and 4th show the same pattern, but with opposite sign relative to category 1 and 2.  
(Table 8.  Marginal effects in the ordered logit) 
The “experimenters” demand more street sex work the less they work, more if 
they are white opposed to non-white, more the younger they are and more the more 
they like to have control when having sex. The “regulars” characteristics are quite the 
opposite. The more experimenters are against gender violence the less they demand 
street sex work (i.e. they demand more, the more gend r violent they are). The more 
experimenters are against sex work, the more they demand; the more they think that 
the sex workers dislike their job and are not different from other women, the less they 
demand; the more they like relationships and responsibilities the more they demand, 
and the less they like variety in their sex life, the more they demand. For the regulars 
all of these effects are reversed.  
Thus the experimenters correspond to a more machist type, with negative views 
of women, of sex work, and of sex workers (who are believed to be different from 
other women but condemned at the same time), and viewing street sex work as a 
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complement to stable relationships. The regulars have more liberal views of women, 
of sex work and of sex workers, the more they dislike control the more they demand, 
and they like variety. Their demand also increases with age and with having a 
permanent job, which may indicate a positive income effect. These appear to be men 
who are happy to satisfy their sexual wants through sex work, which they prefer to 
relationships. In Table 7 we also give the estimates of the probability of being a 
“regular” client as opposed to being an “experimenter”. Comparing these results with 
the marginal effects for the “regulars” derived from the ordered logit given in Table 7, 
we observe that the results are quite similar, which is a further confirmation of the 
conclusions drawn above.  
In Table 7 we also report the estimates from the use of condoms, which is a 
measure of risk aversion on the part of the client (Gertler, 2003). Concentrating on the 
significant parameters16 we note that the probability of using condoms is higher 
among the non-white compared to the white respondents. The probability of using 
condoms is higher among those who are opposed to gender violence relative to those 
who are not, and the probability of using condom is higher the more they favour sex 
work and the less they like variety. It is also interesting to note that among those with 
a good relationship the probability of using a condom is lower than among those with 
a broken relationship. Thus the users of condoms seem to fit the profile of the 
regulars, whereas the non users fit that of the experimenters.      
 
8. Implications and conclusions 
 
16 We note that the distribution of the dependent variable is such that the percentage of 0, i.e. clients who use the condom never 
and seldom is only 5.6%. 
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The results of our empirical analysis confirm the behavioural assumptions behind 
our theoretical framework: stigmatisation of clients and sex workers are important 
characteristics of this market (as reflected in the attitudes of clients in the sample 
towards sex work, towards sex workers, and towards being caught), and demand for 
paid sex is not simply a substitute for demand for free sex. Both of these general 
results confirm the findings of the empirical literature discussed in section 1. 
Moreover, in our sample there appear to be two distinct groups of clients, whose 
personal characteristics and attitudes are radically opposite: experimenters, to whom 
street sex work is a complement to stable relationships, and who hold negative views 
of women, of sex work, and of sex workers; and regulars, who hold more liberal 
views, like variety and find relationships a burden, and for whom paid sex is a 
commodity and a normal good whose demand increases with income. The 
experimenters demand more sex the more they like to have control while the regulars 
do the opposite. This suggest the need to explicitly incorporate this variable when 
modelling demand for sex work, and also to further test with empirical evidence 
whether control in sex is related to perception of control in other areas of a clients’ 
life. This seems particularly important in order to understand whether it is possible to 
test empirically the idea put forward in several papers that demand for sex work is 
related to the construction of male identity (Marttila, 2003; Garofalo, 2002). In this 
sense, it would also be interesting to see which factors are at play in women’s demand 
for male sex work services. 
As far as attitudes towards risk are concerned, we note that risk aversion is also 
correlated to our two clients’ profiles, with experimenters being more risk loving and 
regulars more risk averse. Notwithstanding the selection bias problems presented by 
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our data, our results appear to be in line with those of other studies. Furthermore, our 
evidence also confirms that the demand for sex work is a phenomenon with 
multifaceted characteristics which need to be properly investigated and understood 
when designing regulation for this sector. This is particularly relevant since regulation 
is overwhelmingly concerned with supply-side considerations, and failure to 
understand the demand side of this phenomenon is likely to generate ineffective 
policy outcomes.  
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Table 1. Characteristics of arrested clients.
Variable description Responses of arrested clients National sample 
Race
White
Black or African American
Other
Observations  Total
57.7%
5.2%
37.2%
1313= 100%
84.6%
10.6%
4.8%
1463=100%
Education 
Didn't graduate high school 
Graduated high school
College aft high school 
Received bachelor's 
Received a masters 
Observations  Total
10.5%
18.4%
36.3%
24.2%
10.7%
1329= 100%
12.1%
52.3%
6.9%
18.8%
9.9%
1460= 100%
Labor force Status 
Working Full time 
Working Part time
In school
Unemployed/laid off
Other
Observations  Total
82.9%
5.9%
2.2%
4.4%
4.6%
1275= 100%
77.1%
8.1%
3.3%
5.4%
6.1%
1463= 100%
Average age of arrested clients
Age 18-25
Age 26-35
Age 36-45
Age >46
Observations  Total 
(mean = 38  min=18 and max=84)
12.7%
33.1%
31.1%
23.2%
1248= 100%
14.4%
31.6%
31.2%
22.8%
1463= 100%
Marital Status
Married
Widowed 
Divorced 
Separated   
Never Married 
Observations  Total
42.2%
1.6%
14.9%
6.4%
34.9%
1328= 100%
55.8%
0.8%
11.9%
2.4%
29.1%
1463= 100%
Marriage description 
Very happy
Pretty happy
Not too happy 
Observations  Total 
37.9%
40.3%
21.8%
528= 100%
59.7%
37.9%
2.4%
809= 100%
Sex partners last year
0 partners
1 partner
2 partners
3 -4 partners
more than 5 partners
Observations  Total
    9.9%
37.6%
16.7%
17.0%
18.8%
1315= 100%
10.1%
70.9%
8.2%
7.4%
3.4%
1349= 100%
Frequency of sex during last 12 months 
Not at all
Once or twice
Once a month
3 times per month
Once a week
2-3 times per week
More than 3 time per week
Observations  Total
10.3%
9.1%
15.3%
21.3%
19.2%
17.7%
7.2%
1268= 100%
9%
6.4%
10.9%
18.5%
21.7%
25.1%
8.4%
1317= 100%
Page 30 of 39
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Table 2. Attitudes toward sexual behaviour.
Variable description Responses of arrested clients
Circumstances when 1st with sex worker
Were approached by sex workers
They approached the sex workers on their own.
A group of buddies set them up
Other  
Family member or relatives set them up 
Brothel
Military
Total observations
32.7%
29.7%
23.9%
5.1%
4.5%
2.9%
1.2%
1040=100%
Mostly done with a sex worker 
Oral sex
Vaginal sex
Checked more than 2 acts
Half and half 
Other 
Total observations 
53.6%
14.4%
17.8%
10.5%
3.7%
911=100%
Condom use with sex workers
Always use it
Often
Sometimes
Never use it
Seldom
Total observations
74.2%
11.7%
7.1%
4.2%
2.8%
1024=100%
Sex with prostitute during last 12 months 
Never
Only one time
More than 1 time but less than once per month
1 to 3 times per month
Once or 2 times per week
3-4 times per week
5 or more times per week
Total observations 
26.8%
26.7%
34.6%
9.3%
1.7%
0.4%
0.5%
1054=100%
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Table 3. Motives for seeking sex workers.
Agree  Strongly 
and
Agree somewhat
in percent
Disagree
Strongly and  
disagree somewhat 
in percent
Total
In percent
Total
observations
Difficulty-meeting women who are not nude 
dancers or prostitutes 23 77 100 1244
Think most women find me unattractive 
physically 24 76 100 1248
Want different kind of sex than regular partner 41 59 100 1237
Shy and awkward when try to meet a woman 41 59 100 1246
Have sex with a prostitute than have a 
onventional relationship with a woman 18 82 100 1244
Excited by the idea of approaching a prostitute 43 57 100 1244
Don't have the time for a conventional 
relationship 32 68 100 1239
I don't want the responsibilities of a conventional 
relationship 28 72 100 1233
Like to have a variety of sexual partners 41 59 100 1244
Like to be in control when I'm having sex 42 58 100 1232
Like to be with a woman who likes to get nasty 52 48 100 1230
Need to have sex immediately when aroused 31 69 100 1235
Like rough hard sex 19 81 100 1233
Table 4. Rape myth acceptance.
Variables Agree and 
Somewhat agree
Disagree and
Somewhat 
disagree
Total observations
Stuck-up woman deserve a lessons 7% 93% 1200=100%
Women hitchhiking get what they deserve. 9% 91% 1203=100%
Provocative dress asks for trouble 30% 70% 1223=100%
Rape victims have bad reputation 17% 83% 1200=100%
Forced sex after necking’s woman fault 16% 84% 1197=100%
Going to home implies willing to have sex 23% 77% 1218=100%
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Table 5. The results of the factor analysis.
Factors Eigenvalues Variables 
Factor1
'Against gender violence'
0.5305    
0.5462   
0.5814   
0.6778
0.5036      
0.6396
Forced sex after necking's woman's fault
Women hitchhiking deserve rape  
Stuck-up women deserve a lesson                              
Sex fun if woman fights                                     
Some women like being smacked                                
Want sex more when angry  
Factor2
'Against sex work'
-0.6296    
-0.6586    
0.7296 
0.6644      
0.5323  
Prostitution creates problems
Cops should crack down on prostitution
Prostitution not wrong
Should legalize prostitution
Should decriminalize prostitution
Factor3
'Sex workers are not different and dislike their 
jobs'
0.5301    
0.4821    
0.5765   
0.5483   
Sex workers like sex more
Sex workers like sex rougher
Sex workers enjoy work
Sex workers like men
Factor4
'Like Relationship'
0.4988    
0.7108   
0.6952    
Prefer prostitution to relationship
No time for relationship
Don't want relationship responsibilities
Factor5
'Variety dislike'
0.4599
0.5134     
0.4755    
Excited by approaching sex workers
Like to have a variety of partners
Like woman who gets nasty
Factor6
'Relationship troubles'
0.4833 
0.7355
0.6250
Serious trouble with partner
Separated from partner
Broke up with partner
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Tab 6. Effects of variables on demand for sex work
Effects of variables on demand for sex work Signs: A priori expectations Signs: Estimates 
Education ? Not significant
Full time job + +
Race ? +
Executive officer ? Not significant
Married ? -
Like relationship - -
Dislike variety - -
Relationship trouble + ?
Against sex work - -
Dislike control ? +
Against gender violence ? +
Sex workers dislike their jobs ? +
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Table 7. Estimation results.
Variables Ordered Logit Logit: Probability of 
being a “regular” client 
Logit: Probability of using 
condom
Education =1 college or more; 
=0 otherwise
0.160
(0.194)
0.067
(0.243)
0.067
(0.474)
Work status =1 Full time; =0 otherwise 0.655**
(0.281)
0.656*
(0.347)
0.476
(0.564)
Race =1 if non white; =0 white 0.491***
(0.186)
0.201
(0.226)
1.121**
(0.576)
Job =1executives/business managers;
=0 otherwise
-0.125
(0.170)
-0.151
(0.209)
-0.023
(0.415)
Marriage =1 married; =0 otherwise -0.312*
(0.173)
-0.118
(0.213)
0.090
(0.412)
Control dislike 0.276***
(0.096)
0.220*
(0.118)
-0.062
(0.234)
Age 0.017*
(0.009)
0.030***
(0.011)
-0.031
(0.020)
Factor1 'against gender violence' 0.181*
(0.108)
0.274**
(0.136)
0.464*
(0.259)
Factor2 'against sex work' -0.159*
(0.094)
-0.199*
(0.112)
-0.400*
(0.222)
Factor3 'sex workers not different and dislike 
their job'
0.198**
(0.101)
0.200*
(0.124)
-0.102
(0.242)
Factor4  'like relationships' -0.536***
(0.112)
-0.641***
(0.137)
-0.351
(0.266)
Factor5  'variety dislike' -0.968***
(0.121)
-1.031***
(0.151)
0.692***
(0.281)
Factor6  'relationship troubles ' -0.026
(0.109)
0.006
(0.137)
0.482*
(0.293)
Threshold 1 0.788
(0.550)
Threshold 2 2.233***
(0.559)
Threshold 3 4.452***
(0.580)
Constant -2.501***
(0.692)
3.643***
(1.339)
# of observations
Mcfaddens rho
582
0.14
582
0.18
570
0.71
Standard errors in parentheses. (Blank: Not significant. ***:Significant at 1%, **: Significant at 5%, *:Significant 10%)
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Table 8:  Marginal effects in the ordered logit
Variables Never with sex 
workers 
Once with sex 
workers 
More than 1 time but 
less then once per 
month
1 to 3 times per 
month 
Education =1 college or more;
=0 otherwise
-0.0269
(0.033)
-0.012
(0.014)
0.027
(0.033)
0.012
(0.014)
Work status =1 Full time; 
=0 otherwise 
-0.123**
(0.059)
-0.033***
(0.008)
0.113**
(0.048)
0.0429***
(0.015)
Race =1 if non white;=0 white -0.077***
(0.028)
-0.044**
(0.018)
0.079***
(0.029)
0.0425**
(0.017)
Job =1executives/business managers
=0 otherwise
0.02
(0.028)
0.01
(0.014)
-0.02
(0.028)
-0.010
(0.013)
Marriage =1 married; 0 otherwise 0.051*
(0.0287)
0.026*
(0.015)
-0.052*
(0.029)
-0.025*
(0.014)
Control  Dislike -0.045***
(0.016)
-0.023***
(0.008)
0.046***
(0.017)
0.022***
(0.008)
Age -0.002**
(0.002)
-0.001*
(0.0008)
0.002*
(0.0015)
0.001*
(0.0007)
Factor1 'Against gender violence' -0.029*
(0.018)
-0.015*
(0.0094)
0.030*
(0.018)
0.014*
(0.0088)
Factor2 'Against sex work' 0.026*
(0.015)
0.013*
(0.0083)
-0.026*
(0.015)
-0.012*
(0.0077)
Factor3 'Sex workers not different and 
dislike their job'
-0.032**
(0.016)
-0.016*
(0.009 )
0.033**
(0.0172)
0.016*
(0.0083)
Factor4 'Like Relationships' 0.088***
(0.0186)
0.045***
(0.011)
-0.09***
(0.020)
-0.043***
(0.009)
Factor5 'Variety dislike' 0.159***
(0.02)
0.085***
(0.015)
-0.162***
(0.024)
-0.078***
(0.012)
Factor6 'Relationship troubles' 0.004
(0.017)
0.002
(0.009)
-0.004
(0.018)
-0.002
(0.008)
Standard errors in brackets. (Blank: non significant,  *: significant at 10%, **:  5%, ***: 1%).  
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Appendix
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the factor analysis. Number of obs= 582.
Agree 
strongly 
=1
Agree 
somewhat
=2
Disagree 
somewhat
=3
Disagree 
strongly 
=4
Total 
%
Factor1 Forced sex after necking's woman's fault 3,26 10,48 23,02 63,23 100
Women hitchhiking deserve rape  2,23 4,81 14,43 78,52 100
Stuck-up women deserve a lesson                              2,41 3,26 8,25 86,08 100
Sex fun if woman fights                                     1,55 4,12 11,68 82,65 100
Some women like being smacked                                3,09 18,38 25,95 52,58 100
Want sex more when angry 1,72 4,64 9,79 83,85 100
Factor2 Prostitution creates problems 15,46 25,77 29,55 29,21 100
Cops should crack down on prostitution 13,06 26,12 26,12 34,71 100
Prostitution not wrong 17,35 34,02 30,76 17,87 100
Should legalize prostitution 41,24 33,33 12,03 13,4 100
Should decriminalize prostitution 39,18 32,47 17,01 11,34 100
Factor 3 Sex workers like sex more 4,3 15,64 34,19 45,88 100
Sex workers like sex rougher 2,58 15,54 32,99 51,89 100
Sex workers enjoy work 2,75 22,85 47,77 26,63 100
Sex workers like men 5,84 34,36 42,44 17,35 100
Factor4 Prefer prostitution to relationship 6,19 15,98 21,31 56,53 100
No time for relationship 13,06 22,16 18,21 46,56 100
Don't want relationship responsibilities 12,71 17,7 17,53 52,06 100
Factor5 Excited by approaching sex workers 12,89 38,14 24,05 24,91 100
Lke to have a variety of partners 14,78 35,57 19,93 29,73 100
Like woman who gets nasty 22,68 35,4 19,42 22,51 100
Yes=1 no =0 Total % Total 
obs
Factor 6 Serious trouble with partner 32,99 67,01 100 582
Separated from partner 20,79 79,21 100 582
Broke up with partner 20,1 97,9 100 582
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Table A2 Dependent variable for the ordered logit
Frequency of sex with sex worker during last year . No of Obs 582
Frequency per cent
=1 never 25.4
=2 once 27.0
=3 more than 1 but less than once per month 35.0
=4 1 to 3 times per month 12.5
Table A3. (1) Dependent variable for the probability of being a regular client; (2) Dependent variable for the probability 
of using a condom. 
(1) Frequency of sex with sex 
worker during last year.
No. of Obs 582
Frequency 
per cent
(2) Condom Use No of Obs 570
Frequency
Per cent
=1 if more than once with a sex 
worker in the last year
52.4 =1 use more than once and often 
the condom
94.4
=0 if never or once with a sex 
worker last year
47.6 =0 use condom never and 
seldom
5.6
Table A4. Descriptive statistics of the variables of the sample used for estimation in table 6. Number of obs=582.
Variable Mean St. dev Min Max
Education:=1 college or more, =0 otherwise 0.7457 0.435 0 1
Work status =1 Full time, =0 otherwise 0 .907 0.290 0 1
Race: =1 if non white, =0 white 0.355 0.4791 0 1
Job:=1 executives/ managers, =0 otherwise 0.4329 0.495 0 1
Marriage :=1 married, =0 otherwise 0.482 0.500 0 1
Control dislike 2.735 0.941 1 4
Age 39 10.009 18 76
Factor1 'Against gender violence' 0.035 0.8693 -5.488 1.154
Factor2 'Against sex work' 0.011 0.929 -2.264 2.189
Factor3 'Sex workers not different and dislike their job' 0.0006 0.885 -3.0865 2.5491
Factor4 'Like relationships' 0.0077 0.8919 -2.623 1.667
Factor5 'Variety dislike' -0.020 0.856 -2.424 2.490
Factor6  'Relationship troubles ' 0.004 0.834 -1.385 4.129
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Table A5. Control like
Do you like control during sex? Total observations = 582
Frequency per cent 
=1 if agree strongly 10.3
= 2 if agree somewhat 30.1
=3 if disagree somewhat 35.4
=4 if disagree strongly 24.2
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